Download e-book for kindle: Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour: Game Theory, by Steffen Huck, Werner Güth

By Steffen Huck, Werner Güth

This quantity comprises 16 unique articles documenting fresh development in knowing strategic habit. of their kind they replicate a complete spectrum of coexisting ways: from orthodox online game conception through behavioral video game concept, bounded rationality and fiscal psychology to experimental economics. there are many new versions and insights however the publication additionally illustrates the bounds of what we all know this day and explains the frontiers of day after today.

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Additional info for Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour: Game Theory, Experiments and Bounded Rationality

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The marginal cost parameter c captures the technological opportunities for punishing others. 4 If Other chooses D, then Self receives a utility bonus of ln h (but no fitness bonus) from Other’s harm h. In other states, utility is equal to own payoff. The motivational parameter is subject to evolutionary forces and is intended to capture an individual’s temperament – for example, susceptibility to anger. See Frank (1988) for an extended discussion of such traits. The functional forms for punishment technology and motivation are convenient (we shall see shortly that parameterizes the incurred cost) but are not necessary for the main results.

The marginal cost parameter c captures the technological opportunities for punishing others. 4 If Other chooses D, then Self receives a utility bonus of ln h (but no fitness bonus) from Other’s harm h. In other states, utility is equal to own payoff. The motivational parameter is subject to evolutionary forces and is intended to capture an individual’s temperament – for example, susceptibility to anger. See Frank (1988) for an extended discussion of such traits. The functional forms for punishment technology and motivation are convenient (we shall see shortly that parameterizes the incurred cost) but are not necessary for the main results.

The unique solution of the first order condition is h∗ = /c and the incurred cost is indeed ch∗ = . For the moment 34 Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups A—Basic trust game Self T Other D (–1, 2) N C (0, 0) (1, 1) B—Trust with a vengeance technology Self T Other N C (0, 0) (1, 1) D Self* [0≤h≤8] (–1 –ch, 2 –h) Note: *Utility payoff to Self is v ln h – 1 – ch. C—Trust with a vengeance (reduced*) Self T Other D (–1 –v, 2 –v /c) N C (0, 0) (1, 1) Note: *Self’s last move on branch D inflicts harm h = v /c at cost v.

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Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour: Game Theory, Experiments and Bounded Rationality by Steffen Huck, Werner Güth


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